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Introduction
Calls for greater transparency from social insti-
tutions are gaining momentum in American 
culture, especially given concerns about the 
potential risks to society from misconduct 
hidden from public view. Such concerns have 
escalated since the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Rourke, 2014, Kelly, 2009), where consequences 
of misconduct had broad impact. While social 
institutions had little role in bringing about that 
crisis, broadly applied transparency is increas-
ingly represented as society’s best defense 
against unethical behavior (Jennings, Mitchell, 
& Hannah, 2014; Morrison & Mujtaba, 2010). 
Accordingly, advocates for increased transpar-
ency are acquiring a growing voice in the field of 
private philanthropy. 
Private foundations have been criticized for 
conducting themselves in a manner that is 
mysterious (Fleishman, 2007) and unaccount-
able (Sandy, 2007). Yet, the privacy literature 
suggests that transparency is not a panacea 
(Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Bernstein, 2012; 
Desai, 2011; Osborne, 2004; Hannan, Polos, & 
Carroll, 2003). It is not achieved without cost 
(Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Desai, 2011; Osborne 
2004, Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2003), and its 
influence on conduct and accountability within 
private philanthropy may be less than straight-
forward (Fox, 2017; Reid, 2017; Andrews, 2014; 
Rourke, 2014). Nonetheless, growing interest in 
transparency on the part of private foundations 
is easily observed in recent professional journals 
and conference agendas.
Key to this transparency debate is whether pri-
vate foundations are viewed as genuinely private 
or as quasi-public entities. Some argue that the 
Key Points
 • The perception that private foundations 
lack accountability has led to calls for 
greater transparency. The literature, 
however, suggests that transparency is 
neither a panacea nor achieved without 
cost, and that its positive influence on the 
conduct of philanthropy may be less than 
straightforward. 
 • This article seeks to examine transparent 
and opaque practice in private philanthropy, 
studying the literature as well as findings 
from interviews with foundation staff, 
trustees, and grantees that sought answers 
to two relevant questions: Does opacity exist 
in private philanthropy? Have foundations 
and grantees developed strategies for 
overcoming challenges related to opacity?
 • U.S. tax law affords private philanthropy 
unique discretion regarding transparent prac-
tice. Before abandoning such discretionary 
capacity, it might be productive for private 
foundations to explore how transparent and 
opaque practices impact their reputation and 
inhibit or support their activities.
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tax advantages and charitable status enjoyed 
by private foundations make them quasi-public 
institutions (Fleishman, 2007). Others contend 
that because their assets derive entirely from 
private donors and not from fundraising activi-
ties, they are genuinely private entities (Brody & 
Tyler, 2010). 
Transparency in private philanthropy is a com-
plex matter. Considered essential to public 
trust (Fleishman, 2007) and an enhancement 
to grantee relations (Boldouc, Buchanan, & 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1408
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Buteau, 2007), transparency can also impede 
certain philanthropic advantages uniquely 
available in opaque settings (Reid, 2017, Desai, 
2012). Through tax returns, foundations reveal 
the identity of trustees and key personnel; 
insider compensation; grant recipients and grant 
amounts; and investment holdings. Yet they are 
being challenged to be even more transparent.   
The research on which this article is based was 
intentionally agnostic about whether founda-
tions are private or quasi-public entities — or 
even if they should operate with more trans-
parency. The findings here reach beyond 
philosophical convictions to instead provide 
a more practical examination of transparent/
opaque practice and related issues. Accordingly, 
this research contributes to a more complete 
understanding of both practices in private 
philanthropy. A list of questions is provided to 
help foundations assess their practices within 
the context of philanthropic objectives.
Literature Review
Private foundations represent a segment of the 
nonprofit social benefit community known as the 
third sector, which exists in the space between 
government and the private sector (Bubb, 2010). 
The institutional form of private philanthropy 
is a relatively recent development in U.S. public 
policy (Fleishman, 2007; Gardner, 1992), gener-
ally thought to have been in existence for just 
over a century. 
Approximately 78,580 U.S. private foundations 
collectively control an estimated $584 billion 
in charitable assets, accounting for 82 percent 
of combined assets under the control of all cat-
egories of domestic foundations (Foundation 
Center, 2014). Private foundations annually dis-
tribute approximately 5 percent of their assets, 
an amount estimated at $35.4 billion in 2014, 
for charitable purposes (Diller, 1993). Over the 
past couple of decades, government support to 
domestic nonprofits in the United States has 
•  Private philanthropy and private foundation are used interchangeably to represent what 
the Internal Revenue Code refers to as an “independent foundation.” 
•  Transparency is defined by Osborne (2004) as “helping people to see into systems and 
understand why decisions are taken” (p. 292). 
•  Opacity is a practice that effectively reduces transparency between organizational insiders 
and outsiders (Reid, 2015).
•  External stakeholders are “government agencies, private donors, ... media, clients of the 
organization,” and members of the public with legitimate interests in private foundations 
(Hodge & Piccolo, 2011, p. 521).
•  Foundation insiders include donors and donor families, trustees, and key managers 
(Crimm, 2001). 
•  Philanthropic freedom is the unimpeded ability to put private contributions to charitable 
purpose by making grants, setting grant terms, and resisting political or other external 
influence in grant decisions, as well as avoiding pressure for external accountability related 
to grant decisions or outcomes (Hudson Institute, 2015).
•  Strategic grantees are those who private foundations perceive as especially important to 
specific charitable interests (Reid, 2015).
FIGURE 1  Defined Terms
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significantly declined and such support from pri-
vate foundations has grown substantially (Kerlin 
& Pollak, 2013). This, understandably, seems to 
have accelerated interest among grant seekers in 
private foundations.
According to Fleishman (2007), private founda-
tions run the risk of new legislative or regulatory 
oversight should they fail to respond appropri-
ately to demands for greater transparency. Yet 
the opacity under which private foundations have 
been able to operate has provided grantmaking 
capacities not available to other kinds of 
grantmaking organizations (Reid, 2017, Dowie, 
2011). Those unique capacities need to be better 
understood within the context of this debate.   
Opaque practices can make prospecting private 
foundations especially difficult for grant seekers 
(Glücker & Ries, 2012). It has been argued that 
opaque practice and a failure to be externally 
accountable (Sandy, 2007; Ostrander, 2007; Leat, 
2006) stem from arrogance and a sense of enti-
tlement among foundation insiders. Foundation 
program officers have been described as aloof 
toward and even disrespectful of grant seekers 
(Boldouc et al., 2007); Tuan’s “Dance of Deceit” 
(2004) also observed the potential for such con-
duct by program officers.  
Research into private foundation practice, how-
ever, failed to substantiate existence of such 
behavior among foundation insiders (Reid, 2015), 
which raises the possibility that opaque practice 
could derive from other factors. Such practices by 
private foundations were observed to be efforts 
intended to protect important grantmaking 
capacities, such as preserving philanthropic free-
dom, shielding grant decisions from political 
considerations, facilitating the ability to experi-
ment, making important grants potentially too 
controversial for other funders, and more freely 
engaging in higher-risk projects (Reid, 2017).  
Most organizations seek to enlarge their 
autonomy as part of their efforts to limit exter-
nal interference that can inhibit efficiency or 
innovation (Drees & Heugens, 2013), and pri-
vate foundations have been observed to make 
practical use of their autonomous capacity for 
similar purposes (Reid, 2015). Perhaps evidence 
of practical use of opaque practices by private 
foundations, combined with natural inclina-
tions toward enhancing autonomy, might better 
explain motives underlying opaque practice in 
private philanthropy.
Grant seekers are understandably interested in 
greater foundation transparency with respect 
to grantmaking processes, decisions, and out-
comes (Brock, Buteau, & Gopal, 2013). Yet, 
some transparency-related interests of grant 
seekers may be at odds with efforts to preserve 
autonomy within foundations. It is unclear if 
such competing objectives can be universally 
resolved for all grant-seeking nonprofits, but 
research has found that foundations do engage 
in situationally specific transparency with cer-
tain grantees (Reid, 2015).    
Research Questions
This research sought to confirm the existence of 
and better understand contextual circumstances 
underlying foundation opaque practice, as well 
as instances of greater transparency. Among the 
research questions that guided this investigation, 
two are relevant to this article:
1. Does opacity exist in private philanthropy? 
2. Have foundations and/or grantees devel-
oped strategies for overcoming challenges 
related to opacity?
The first question required an investiga-
tion of opaque practices employed by private 
This research sought to 
confirm the existence of and 
better understand contextual 
circumstances underlying 
foundation opaque practice, 
as well as instances of greater 
transparency. 
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practice emerged, and were helpful in under-
standing both the extent to which foundations 
engaged in such practices and the contextual 
circumstances in which they occurred. The sec-
ond question prompted an assessment of the 
relationships between foundations and grant-
ees to determine if they overcame challenges 
stemming from opaque practices to establish 
more effective partnerships and greater foun-
dation transparency. This assessment led to the 
discovery of situational transparency, which 
foundations practiced with grantees they per-
ceived as strategic. 
Methodology
This investigation employed an interpretive 
research model, which differs significantly from 
mere confirmation of hypotheses or propositions 
(Stebbins, 2001). This methodology permitted 
freedom to move beyond a binary approach in 
analyzing data, resulting in a deeper understand-
ing of both practice and context.  
The study involved interviews with 19 current 
and past foundation professional staff, 16 foun-
dation trustees, and 16 grantees; all participants 
were assured of confidentiality. The total 
number of interviews — 51 — was large for a 
qualitative study and resulted in significant data 
on 30 family foundations, two health care con-
versions, and a foundation started by the owner 
of a private company for the benefit of employ-
ees. (See Figure 2.) 
The professional staff who participated in the 
interviews represented 22 private foundations, 
with mean assets of $455 million. The asset size 
of these foundations ranged from $1 million to 
$5.99 billion and they were located in 10 states. 
Some foundation staff participants reported 
experiences in more than one foundation and 
there was inadvertent overlap between trustee 
and staff participants in five foundations. The 
trustees represented 15 private foundations, with 
mean assets of $237.2 million. Their total assets 
ranged from $1.7 million to $2.3 billion and they 
were located in seven states. 
Among the 16 grantees interviewed were rep-
resentatives of 14 paired-grantee agencies, 
recruited by foundations participants, com-
prised of trustees and staff. This led to important 
FIGURE 2  Foundation Participants FIGURE 3  Grantee Participants
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sampling (Advice, 2000). Confidence in the sam-
ple was further enhanced by having distinctly 
different classes of foundation participants (e.g., 
trustees and staff) in addition to grantees, and 
in utilizing multiple intermediaries (Sinkovics & 
Alfoldi, 2012) to recruit knowledgeable subjects 
(Devers & Frankel, 2000). 
There was a different objective in recruiting 
grantee participants. While the literature con-
tains reports from grant seekers on difficult 
experiences with foundations, it was necessary 
to find grantees with good foundation relation-
ships in order to determine if some of them had 
overcome untoward effects of opaque founda-
tion practice. Given this objective, participating 
foundations were invited to recruit grantees they 
considered to be strategic. 
Of the 16 organizations that agreed to partic-
ipate, 14 were considered “paired grantees” 
because of their close relationship to participat-
ing foundations. The other participants were a 
colleague recruited by one of the paired grantees 
and a representative of a regional United Way 
affiliate who asked to participate. The grantee 
participants varied significantly in annual bud-
get, geographic location, and mission. While 
participants were not solicited on the basis of 
demographics, most of the participants were 
from the Southwest as a result of the location of 
two of the intermediaries. 
Credibility of Data and Analysis
The following procedures were followed to 
assure trustworthiness of data analysis and 
findings: 
• There was a comprehensive review of 
the literature, the research methodology 
was appropriate, participants confirmed 
interview summaries, interviewers had 
domain-specific knowledge, and interview-
ees were accessed through third parties. 
• To support the transferability of the 
findings, there were a large number of inter-
views (Shenton, 2004). 
insights into perceptions mutually shared by 
foundations and grantees as well as into perspec-
tives unique to grantees. (See Figure 3.) 
Data Analysis
Strategies for documenting and analyzing data 
included multiple means of triangulation, with 
a clear audit trail for recorded interviews, tran-
scribed data, and analysis. Interviewing three 
distinct categories of participants supported 
triangulation of data (Patton, 1999). Findings and 
analyses were also confirmed by subject-matter 
experts from four foundations and two grantees, 
none of which participated in the research. 
Reliability in qualitative research is supported by 
the accuracy of insights gained from interviews 
and assuring proper representation of the views 
of the subjects (Creswell & Miller, 2000). This 
required a systematic process capturing “con-
cepts, themes, and dimensions” (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2012, p. 22). Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed, and data were coded using 
NVivo 10 software (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). 
Purposive Sampling 
Purposive sampling is often employed to iden-
tify and recruit subjects for a population to be 
studied, especially when subjects are difficult for 
researchers to identify or recruit (Barratt, Ferris, 
& Leton, 2015). Under such circumstances, 
purposive sampling is especially helpful in iden-
tifying and securing subjects (Tongco, 2007). 
Experts in private philanthropy who were con-
sulted during the design of this project suggested 
that the research would be more successful if 
gatekeepers for potential subjects, rather than 
random selection, were employed to recruit 
potential participants — an approach consistent 
with purposive sampling (Devers & Frankel, 
2000). Accordingly, all foundation participants 
were secured through three intermediary foun-
dation membership organizations: Philanthropy 
Southwest, the New Mexico Association of 
Grantmakers, and Grantmakers for Education. 
Foundation participants varied in geographic 
location, asset size, and grantmaking interests 
— a diversity consistent with effective purposive 
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• The consistency of questions, use of a sin-
gle interviewer, and overlapping classes of 
participants (e.g., foundation trustees/staff 
and grantees) enhanced the reliability of the 
findings. (Shenton, 2004).
• The credibility of observations was 
enhanced by triangulation of three sets of 
data, use of consistent methodology, a clear 
audit trail for data and findings (Shenton, 
2004), and confirmation of findings by six 
independent domain experts. 
Findings
Findings are reported within the context of four 
indicators of opaque practice, which evolved 
from the research: the capacity to maintain 
relative anonymity (i.e., ability to maintain a 
low public profile), to limit unwanted outside 
influence while maintaining independence in 
grant decisions (i.e., preserving philanthropic 
freedom), to sustain homogeneity of insider 
organizational control (i.e., perpetuating insider 
control), and to protect autonomous domain 
(i.e., resisting external accountability/reporting). 
Findings for the second research question also 
address how grant seekers evolved into strategic 
grantees, which are important in understanding 
the strategies addressed.   
Question No. 1: Does Opacity Exist in Private 
Philanthropy?
The following are findings related to foundation 
practices with external parties including grant 
seekers, which generally confirmed existence of 
significant opacity.
1. Low public profile: Most foundation par-
ticipants, especially family foundations, 
maintained a low profile within the com-
munities they served. Only half of the 
participating foundations had websites. 
Some accepted grant applications only by 
invitation, and several prohibited grantees 
from publicly acknowledging their grants. 
Foundations were often motivated to 
manage their public profile to avoid over-
whelming limited staff with distracting 
inquiries.  
2. Preservation of philanthropic freedom: 
Participants overwhelmingly reported 
the ability to make grant decisions with-
out concerns about external stakeholder 
perceptions, effectively shielding grant 
decisions from outside interference. As one 
grantee remarked, “If the mayor calls on 
your behalf, you might have a better chance 
at the community foundation than if the 
mayor calls a private foundation.” This 
allowed the foundations greater freedom to 
innovate, experiment, make grants consid-
ered important that might otherwise be too 
politically risky for public grantmakers, and 
to administer grants with greater flexibility. 
3. Perpetual insider control: The trustees of 
most private foundations were largely insid-
ers: family, friends, or business associates 
of the founder or subsequent generations. 
With successive generations of trustees, 
family foundations were typically able to 
perpetuate insider control. “Because we are 
a private family foundation,” said one par-
ticipant, “the board members are appointed 
by … the donors.”
4. Limiting external accountability/reporting:  
Few private foundation participants 
Most foundation participants, 
especially family foundations, 
maintained a low profile 
within the communities 
they served. Only half of the 
participating foundations had 
websites. Some accepted grant 
applications only by invitation, 
and several prohibited grantees 
from publicly acknowledging 
their grants. 
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Findings suggested that grant seekers who 
became strategic grantees followed a fairly 
consistent evolution: scanning for relevant foun-
dation interests, persistence in achieving access 
to foundation insiders, patience in developing 
relationships, and establishing trust. (See Figure 
4.) Grant opportunities were not pursued until 
this process was reasonably complete.
The first two steps involve a diligent process 
of foundation prospecting through a detailed 
investigation of a foundation’s mission, interests, 
philosophical or ideological convictions, and 
grantmaking through a review of tax returns, 
data base services, foundation documents, and 
observations from previous grantees, former 
consultants, and friends of foundation insiders. 
Grantees then sought opportunities to meet with 
foundation insiders to establish access and gather 
additional information. Grantees were careful 
to avoid raising grant seeking motives too early 
in the process, and focused instead on building 
meaningful relationships, based on shared inter-
ests and openness to new ideas, though candid 
sharing of successes, failures, and lessons learned 
from prior work. 
At this point, grantees reported they had bet-
ter access to and relationships with private 
provided annual reports, and the websites 
that did exist often contained limited con-
tent. Many private foundations reported 
that they routinely and actively limit out-
siders’ access to information about internal 
processes and grant activities, including 
criteria for grantmaking and reasons for 
application denials, and make grants anony-
mously or with limited public notice. 
Question No. 2: Strategies for Opacity-Related 
Challenges 
Private foundations were found to engage in 
situationally enhanced transparency with cer-
tain grantees in ways intended to improve 
collaborative relationships. Grantee participants 
overwhelmingly confirmed this observation.
Foundations were not uniformly transparent 
with all grantees. Some strategic grantees devel-
oped deep relationships with foundation partners 
that seemed to produce situational transparency 
that was substantive and mutual; such transpar-
ency was not typically extended to nonstrategic 
grantees. Foundation and grantee participants 
reported that such relationships, and the cor-
responding transparency, enabled especially 
meaningful and satisfying projects. 
FIGURE 4  Process for Becoming a Strategic Grantee
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potential grantmakers. Private foundations 
exhibited enthusiasm for their partnerships 
with strategic grantees and were willing 
to be more open in their support. Strategic 
grantees also reported untethered access to 
their foundation partners. Said one grantee, 
“Most of our private funders ... care about 
what we’re doing. They care about, at the 
end of the day, the lives that have been 
impacted in our community.”
2. Preservation of philanthropic freedom: Efforts 
to protect against outside influence in 
grantmaking did not extend to strategic 
grantees. Input from strategic grantees was 
welcomed and encouraged. Private foun-
dations were much more relaxed about 
preservation of their philanthropic freedom 
with strategic grantees, who reportedly 
were intimately involved in decisions 
about grant-program details and strategy. 
Opaque practices were eased, if not com-
pletely eliminated, in favor of promoting 
genuine partnership engagement with 
strategic grantees. A foundation’s capacity 
to embrace risk was extended to its grant-
ees: “I’m not afraid to drill dry holes,” said 
one foundation official. “That’s where the 
money came from.”
3. Perpetual insider control: While foundations 
continued to perpetuate insider control, 
strategic grantees were given significantly 
greater access to insiders, including trustees, 
with whom they enjoyed active exchanges 
of ideas and experiences. Strategic grantees 
enjoyed a status functionally equivalent to 
foundation insiders: “They treat you like 
family,” said one.
4. Limiting external accountability/reporting: 
Private foundations were less protective 
of public knowledge about their activities 
with strategic grantees, and more likely to 
employ external communication to pro-
mote strategic grantees and their projects. 
Private foundations imposed high expec-
tations regarding grantee accountability, 
but were willing to be accountable to stra-
tegic partners. As a grantee acknowledged, 
foundations; foundations viewed grantees less as 
mere resource-seekers than as trusted associates 
who were strategic to shared philanthropic inter-
ests. Under these circumstances, foundations 
reportedly demonstrated willingness to relax 
opaque practices, and relationships were formed 
involving the kind of cooperation deemed essen-
tial to effective partnerships (Fairfield & Wing, 
2008). Grantees reported that foundations treated 
them as valued partners and were more deferen-
tial to their expertise. And a representative of one 
foundation observed, “I tell my partners all the 
time: ‘You guys are the experts. That’s why I’m 
here, to learn from you. This is a partnership’”
Relationships between foundations and strategic 
grantees thus progressed beyond a transactional 
nature to more integrated, intimate partner-
ships that tended to involve recurring grants 
— creating relational currency on which major 
initiatives were progressively built. Said one 
grantee, “The relationship doesn’t stop and start 
back up when it’s time to reapply again; there’s 
information sharing and sharing of successes — 
and even setbacks — with those foundations.”
Participating foundations reported that strate-
gic grantees were especially important to their 
grantmaking objectives; they enjoyed high levels 
of perceived relevance, trust, and respect from 
foundation partners. One foundation represen-
tative expressed enthusiasm for working “with 
partners that are willing to be by our side to go 
through these bold changes, so long as they’re 
willing to put things on the line as well, [to] 
rethink and re-strategize.”
The following findings provided evidence of vast 
differences in foundation practice with strategic 
grantees, pointing out a practice of situational 
transparency reported here within the context of 
the four indicators of opaque practice:
1. Low public profile: Private foundations were 
much less guarded about public disclosure 
regarding grantmaking and other involve-
ment with strategic grantees. Grantees 
reported that foundation partners actively 
engaged in efforts to attract attention to 
their work and promoted them to other 
The Foundation Review  //  2018  Vol 10:1    85
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“There’s a level of accountability and trans-
parency that as a nonprofit you have to 
maintain, but especially when you’re deal-
ing with a private foundation.”
Key Takeaways 
This research found that private foundations are 
indeed generally opaque, and that they employed 
such opacity in highly pragmatic ways — primar-
ily to enhance their grantmaking ability. While 
such practices result in real barriers to grant 
seekers in general, private foundations were 
surprisingly transparent in certain situations 
and with strategic grantees. When their strategic 
charitable interests aligned, foundations became 
more transparent in order to build more effective 
relationships with their grantees. The level of 
apparent intentionality in the use of opaque and 
transparent capacities by private foundations was 
significant in these findings. 
While opaque foundation practices may con-
found grant seekers, foundation and grantee 
participants reported that such opaque capacities 
benefited their shared charitable activities with 
respect to ability to experiment and test new 
ideas without fear of consequences to institu-
tional reputation. They also reported that opaque 
capacities provided a unique environment for 
grant work that effectively resisted unhelpful 
outside interference and resulted in greater 
flexibility, efficiency, and potential impact. 
The advantages to charitable work in private 
philanthropy are reasonably analogous to the 
flexibility and efficiency enjoyed by privately held 
companies in contrast to publicly traded compa-
nies, from which much greater transparency is 
required. As one foundation representative put it, 
I believe [private] philanthropy can do things that 
the public sector cannot. I believe we can take risks 
and try new things to see if they do work. That 
then allows for new systems to emerge that can be 
utilized by the public sector.
Grantees confirmed that private foundations 
were much less bureaucratic, tended to view 
their grants more as investments seeking social 
returns, and demonstrated greater business 
discipline than other kinds of grantmaking 
organizations. “I would say the angel investors 
are closest to the private foundations — angel 
investors and, possibly, venture capital,” a grantee 
remarked. Grantee participants also expressly 
observed that private foundations are mark-
edly different than other kinds of grantmakers. 
According to grantees, their ability to freely shift 
between opaque and transparent practice was a 
striking example of such difference.    
Limitations
Research is inescapably contextual. Accordingly, 
the findings reported in this article should be 
considered within the specific context of this 
research — especially in two particulars. While 
this was a relatively large qualitative study, it 
remains a very small sample — 33 private foun-
dations within the context of the more than 
78,000 nationwide. And while grantees observed 
that foundations tend to be more generally trans-
parent as they increase in size, larger foundations 
are less likely to participate in the kind of inti-
mate partnerships described in this article. This 
may in part account for some contrasts between 
the findings of this research and the private foun-
dation literature. 
This research found that 
private foundations are indeed 
generally opaque, and that 
they employed such opacity 
in highly pragmatic ways — 
primarily to enhance their 
grantmaking ability. While 
such practices result in real 
barriers to grant seekers in 
general, private foundations 
were surprisingly transparent 
in certain situations and with 
strategic grantees. 
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This study suggested that large, non-local foun-
dations may not possess the ability to shift 
between transparent and opaque practices that 
is exhibited by small and midsize foundations 
that are more proximal to grantees. Differences 
in foundation behavior by scale and proximity 
should be further studied.
Conclusions
This research found that private foundations 
were indeed opaque institutions at the public 
level and with grant seekers; four indicators of 
opaque practice were consistently confirmed 
across most participating foundations. However, 
foundation participants adeptly demonstrated sit-
uational transparency — the willingness to relax 
opaque practices — with select grantees. 
When perceived as strategic grantees, partici-
pants indicated a strong preference for working 
with private foundations over other kinds of 
grantmaking organizations. They were able 
to grow and learn with partner foundations — 
experiment, innovate, and even fail without risk 
to their institutional reputations. They reported 
that relationships with partner foundations 
allowed for deeper, more meaningful work. 
The overwhelming majority of foundation 
participants in this research were family foun-
dations, which represent the vast majority of 
private foundations in the United States. These 
participants were more inclined to embrace 
opaque practices, but were also observed to 
employ their opaque capacities in pragmatic 
ways intended to support charitable objectives. 
They also exhibited more transparency with 
strategic grantees as part of efforts to estab-
lish more effective partnerships for greater 
grantmaking impact.   
U.S. tax law affords private philanthropy unique 
discretion regarding transparent practice. Before 
abandoning such discretionary capacity, it might 
be productive for private foundations to explore 
how transparent and opaque practices impact 
their reputation and inhibit or support their 
activities. This may prove a less than a straight-
forward exercise. 
Foundations that fully embrace the underpin-
nings of transparency advocacy are likely to be 
enthusiastic about opportunities to engage in 
transparent conduct; this approach is known 
as enthusiast transparency. Foundations that 
embrace the principles of privacy advocacy, on 
the other hand, are more likely to merely com-
ply with minimal transparency requirements, 
an approach known as compliant transparency. 
These represent opposing philosophies with 
respect to transparent practice. 
Conflicting philosophical convictions between 
transparency and privacy-rights advocacy might 
suggest that only two options exist in setting 
transparency-related policy. However, research 
findings suggest there is a third, more pragmatic 
option: situational transparency. This option is 
less straightforward and more complex, because 
it requires clear objectives and correspondingly 
nuanced intentionality. It might be helpful to 
consider options for transparent conduct within 
the context of a continuum bounded by opposing 
philosophical convictions. (See Figure 5.)
U.S. tax law affords private 
philanthropy unique discretion 
regarding transparent 
practice. Before abandoning 
such discretionary capacity, 
it might be productive for 
private foundations to 
explore how transparent and 
opaque practices impact their 
reputation and inhibit or 
support their activities.
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Enthusiast Transparency — Advantages 
and Risks
A hallmark of enthusiastic transparency is an 
unqualified commitment to provide to virtually 
all external stakeholders as much insight as pos-
sible into foundation processes, decision-making, 
and achievements. This might include robust, 
informative websites; press releases and position 
papers; meetings with community members and 
grant seekers; public reporting on grant decisions 
and outcomes; and efforts to solicit public input.   
The potential advantages of this approach include 
enhanced public trust and improved access to and 
relationships with grant seekers. Potential risks 
include exposure to outside interference, which 
can compromise philanthropic freedom and 
internal control and lead to greater risk aversion 
for both foundations and grantee partners. 
Compliant Transparency — Advantages 
and Risks
This approach is primarily motivated by a duty 
to satisfy minimal statutory requirements, and 
may also involve a foundation’s attitudes toward 
privacy rights.      
Its potential advantages include the likelihood 
of enhanced autonomy and flexibility as well 
as minimized outside interference, which can 
offer greater control over external access. The 
approach can be a way to better preserve phil-
anthropic freedom, providing more flexibility to 
make risky grants, to experiment, and learn from 
failures. Among its risks are a greater vulnera-
bility to complaints about accountability and an 
accompanying diminishment of public trust, and 
may also impede the development of effective 
grantee relationships.
Situational Transparency — Advantages 
and Risks
The overwhelming majority of foundation par-
ticipants followed this approach to some extent, 
and primarily with strategic grantees. For stra-
tegic grantees, this approach mirrors practices 
embraced more broadly in enthusiast transpar-
ency. Others, however, tend to perceive it as 
more opaque, similar to compliant transparency. 
While not examined in this research, it is pos-
sible that situational transparency can also be 
practiced with select external audiences, such as 
members of the public who are not grant seekers, 
where doing so is considered strategic. 
Situational transparency is unlikely to attract 
outside interference, thereby enhancing phil-
anthropic freedom through possibilities for 
FIGURE 5  Transparency Continuum
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experimentation and risk and the ability to 
make potentially controversial grants. It also 
allows for intimate partnerships with strategic 
stakeholders and grantees. At the same time, 
there is the potential risk of a loss of public trust, 
and the approach can make grantee prospecting 
more difficult.
Questions for Foundations
Foundations are free to follow their philosoph-
ical convictions in choosing their approach to 
transparency. But those interested in a more 
pragmatic policy might consider the following 
questions:
• With whom and in what specific ways can 
transparent practice build public trust? 
What public benefits can be expected from 
specific transparent practices? 
• Are there specific transparent practices that 
could result in unwelcome consequences, 
such as inhibiting grant decisions or chal-
lenging tolerance for risk?
• Which transparent practices should be 
extended to all grant seekers? Are there 
more intimate levels of transparency that 
should be reserved for grantees with whom 
especially deep partnerships exist?
Findings from this research underscore the 
complicated nature of transparency in private 
philanthropy, especially when the approach is 
not entirely guided by philosophical convictions. 
Flexibility in U.S. tax law permits private foun-
dations to make transparency decisions that are 
both pragmatic and nuanced. Potential advan-
tages and risks are not always straightforward, 
and likely require careful contemplation. 
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